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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ARTICLE 1 SECTION 8-THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE-AVIATION FUEL, PURCHASED IN INDIANA,
STORED AND LOADED ABOARD AIRCRAFT IN ILLINOIS AND
CONSUMED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, IS SUBJECT TO THE
ILLINOIS USE TAX.
The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in United
Airlines Inc., v. Mahin, et al.,1 upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois
Use Tax. 2  The use tax in this case applied to aviation fuel, purchased by
United Air Lines3 in Indiana, transported to Illinois for temporary storage
and subsequently consumed in UAL's interstate flights. The Court viewed
the tax in United as one levied upon the storage or the withdrawal therefrom
of the aviation fuel, and not one upon the loading of, or consumption in
interstate commerce. 4  Because of this characterization of the levy, the
Court also held that the Federal Constitution 5 did not prohibit Illinois from
measuring UAL's use tax liability by the amount of fuel actually consumed
in Illinois' airspace.6
I. STATUTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
In order to provide the proper framework for a discussion of the deci-
sion in United, an examination of the basic provisions of the Retailers' Oc-
cupation Tax Act 7 and its complement, the Use Tax Act8 is necessary. The
ROT was enacted in 1933 to help fill revenue needs arising out of the de-
pression and still remains, along with the Use Tax, the backbone of state
revenue.9 The ROT imposes an occupation tax upon persons engaged in
1. 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.1-439.22 (1971).
3. Hereafter referred to as UAL.
4. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973). States are not at
liberty to tax the loading or unloading of interstate commerce. Puget Sound Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Tax Cmm'n, 302 U.S. 90, 92-94 (1937) and Joseph v. Carter & Weeks
Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 427, 433-34 (1947). Mere consumption in interstate
commerce is also not subject to state taxation. Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279
U.S. 245, 252 (1929).
5. The section referred to is the Commerce Clause which reads as follows: "Con-
gress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce with . . . and among the several
states .... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
6 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. (1973). This measurement was
known as the 'burn-off' rule. Discussion of this measurement is omitted here as it
is dealt with in succeeding sections.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 440-453 (1971). The Retailers' Occupation Tax
Act is hereafter referred to as ROT.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.22 (1971).
9. ICE, RETAILERS' OCCUPATION TAX AND RELATED TAX LAws, 1961 LAw FORUM
614.
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the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state. 10
The Act defines a retailer as anyone who engages in the business of selling
tangible personal property to buyers for use or consumption and not resale. 1
It is not a tax upon sales although the tax is measured by the gross receipts
from such sales. 12  Liability is upon the retailer, not his buyer, however,
this did not prevent the seller from passing his tax burden onto the purchaser
separately stated and in addition to the sales price, or in the form of a higher
sales price.13 This continued until the Use Tax Act was enacted in 1955.
B. The Use Tax Act
The Use Tax Act' 4 was directed at protecting the ROT base from re-
duction by the buying of property by Illinois users from out-of-state re-
tailers. 15 In addition, the Use Tax Act was designed to protect local re-
tailers against diversion of their business to out-of-state sellers.' 6
The Use Tax is levied upon the purchaser as the tax is imposed upon
the privilege of using in Illinois tangible personal property purchased at re-
tail. 17 Although the tax is aimed chiefly at out-of-state purchases by Illinois
users, it is also levied upon users who purchase at retail in Illinois.' 8 The
retailer, in Illinois, collects the Use Tax from the buyer (user), but he retains
it to the extent he remits his ROT.19 Should an Illinois user purchase prop-
erty out-of-state from a retailer not required to collect the tax for Illinois,
the purchaser must pay the tax directly to the state.20
Use is defined as the exercise by any person of any right or power
over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of that property.21
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 441 (1971). For a case discussing this definition,
see, Fischman & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 12 Ill. 2d 253, 146 N.E. 2d 54 (1957).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 440 (1971). For a brief discussion of this definition,
see, Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Il. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934).
12. Superior Coal Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 4 Ill. 2d 459, 123 N.E.2d 713 (1954).
13. ICE, supra note 9, at 615.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.1-439.22 (1971).
15. Turner v. Wright, 11 111. 2d 161, 166, 142 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1957).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 163, 142 N.E.2d at 86.
18. Id. at 167, 142 N.E.2d at 88.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.9 (1971).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.3 (1971). Use tax litigation has often involved
the collection of the tax from the out-of-state seller rather than in-state purchasers be
cause the effectiveness of the use tax often depends on such collections. It would be
nearly impossible to collect the tax from the numerous persons that purchase products
in other states. B. SCHARTZ, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 124 (1972). Turner v. Wright,
11 Ill. 2d 161, 166, 142 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1957). Unless the out-of-state retailer has
some activity within the state, i.e. office, solicitors, etc., the state cannot force collec-
tion of the Use Tax without offending the principles of due process. Miller Bros. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). For an Illinois case on this issue, see, National Bel-
las Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.2 (1971). Turner v. Wright, 11 Ill. 2d 161, 163,
142 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1957).
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It is the privilege of this use that is taxed, not the actual use or consumption
of the tangible personal property.22 Consequently, it matters not the extent
to which one exercises the privilege. 23  For example, the tax on a three-
thousand dollar automobile is the same whether or not the user drives one-
thousand miles a year or twenty-thousand miles a year.
While there are a number of exemptions from the tax found in the
Act,2 4 the temporary storage exemption played the decisive role in United.
That exemption, in part pertinent here, provides,
To prevent actual or likely multistate taxation, the tax shall not
apply to the use of . . . property in this State under the following
circumstances:
(d) the temporary storage, in this State, of tangible per-
sonal property which is acquired outside this State and which,
subsequent to being brought into this State and stored here tem-
porarily, is used solely outside this State .... 25 (Emphasis
added.)
The entire discussion of the Illinois Use Tax Act begs the question of
whether or not the Commerce Clause prohibits the taxation of property
purchased out-of-state and brought into the state for future use via interstate
commerce. Authority to exact a use tax upon goods acquired in interstate
commerce without offending the Commerce Clause was upheld in Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co.26 In the decision, Mr. Justice Cardozo indicated that once
the goods were brought into the state for use, interstate commerce was over.
Certain factors in the decision that have also served as guidelines for future
use taxes in other states were the equality of rates between the state's sales
and use taxes27 and the use tax credit allowance for any previously paid
sales or use tax.28
Of particular significance here is the true operation of the tax because
use taxes, such as the Illinois Use Tax, are often broad and encompassing
excise taxes. Through their application, use taxes often reach activities or
uses so intricately a part of interstate commerce that the tax directly bur-
dens the free flow of commerce. The loading of property into interstate
commerce 29 or the mere consumption or use of property in interstate com-
merce,390-while certainly the exercise of dominion and control incident to
22. Turner v. Wright, 1 111. 2d 161, 164, 165, 142 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (1957).
23. Id. at 165, 142 N.E.2d at 87.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.3 (1971).
25. Id.
26. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
27. Id. at 584. Equality of rates eliminates any claims of discrimination against
interstate commerce.
28. Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 587 (1937). Although the Court
was undoubtedly influenced by the credit allowance, the constitutional requirement was
not expressed and it has not been litigated, since most states allow the credit.
29. Case cited supra note 4.
30. Case cited supra note 4.
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the ownership of that property are not uses that states may levy taxes
upon. Such taxes would be violative of the Commerce Clause. Conse-
quently, the courts are faced with the troublesome task of line-drawing,
often through linguistic manipulation in an effort to find what use the
tax is truly levied upon. With the Illinois statutory scheme in proper per-
spective, (tax levied on the privilege of use) and keeping in mind the poten-
tial Commerce Clause violations that might attach to a tax levy on the use
of tangible personal property, the problem in United can be explored.
C. The Purchase by UAL
Since 1953, UAL has purchased large quantities of aviation fuel in
Indiana from the Shell Oil Company in order to facilitate its operations at
O'Hare and Midway airports in Illinois. 31 The fuel is transported from
Indiana by common carrier pipeline or truck to storage facilities near
the airports where it remains for from two to twelve days.3 2 After purifica-
tion, the fuel is then transferred into the tanks of United's aircraft that are
embarking upon or continuing in interstate or foreign commerce. 33  Since
the purchase and delivery of the fuel was in Indiana,3 4 and could not val-
idly be made the incident35 of the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax, the
State's supplemental weapon, the Use Tax came into focus.
D. Application of the Illinois Use Tax by the Department of Revenue
In 1955, the Illinois Use Tax in general, and its temporary storage ex-
emption in particular, were administratively construed by the Illinois De-
partment of Revenue to afford benefit of the temporary storage exemption
to that amount of fuel although stored, withdrawn, and loaded into the
tanks of UAL's aircraft, not actually consumed within the state.3 6 Since
the rate of fuel consumption was precise, and airline routes well regulated,
computation of the tax was possible without much difficulty. Application of
this construction, known as the burn-off rule pertained to all interstate
31. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 624 (1973).
32. Id. at 624, 625 nn. 1, 2. The parties stipulated as to the time the gas re-
mained in storage.
33. Id. at 625, n.3. Some of the gas utilized was for intrastate activities. The
tax upon this was paid and was not in issue.
34. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 Ill. 2d 45, 273 N.E.2d 585 (1971). The
Department of Revenue had early in the litigation stipulated to the sale and delivery
in Indiana. Consequently, they were not able to assert with any success that the de-
livery and sale actually occurred in Illinois. Had it been established that the sale took
place in Illinois, the transaction would have been subject to the ROT without raising
any constitutional issues. See Brief for Appellee at 42, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ma-
hin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
35. A taxable incident is the event the tax is levied upon. It is distinguished
from the measurement which is merely a device used to arrive at the amount of the
tax. Here the sale (incident) was in Indiana and it could not validly be subject to
the Illinois ROT. Throughout the discussion incident, event and use will be used inter-
changeably.
36. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 Ill. 2d 45, 48, 273 N.E.2d 585, 586 (1971).
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common carriers who, having acquired fuel outside the state, stored it in the
state for subsequent use as motive power for vehicles in interstate commerce.
Since UAL stored huge quantities of aviation fuel in order to facilitate its
Chicago operations, and, by comparison, burned-off insignificant quantities
of fuel within the state, its use tax liability was also insignificant. 37
The constitutionality of the burn-off rule appeared questionable in light
of the principles expressed in Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky.38 In Helson,
Kentucky sought to impose a privilege tax upon the fuel consumed by a
ferry boat that stored and loaded its fuel in Illinois but consumed 75 per-
cent of the gas while traveling through Kentucky on its interstate voyage.
The taxpayers' office, business, and property were all in Illinois. Products
in transit in interstate commerce, in addition to the mere consumption of
goods while in transit, are not proper incidents for state taxation.3 9  The
tax in Helson was beyond all doubt a direct and undue burden levied upon
interstate commerce for the mere consumption of fuel while engaged in
strictly interstate commerce. 40 At this juncture, the burn-off theory cannot
be distinguished from the unconstitutional tax in Helson.
This interpretation (burn-off theory of the temporary storage exemp-
tion) continued until the Department of Revenue abruptly reversed its posi-
tion in 1963. The temporary storage provision was reinterpreted to mean
that "temporary storage ends and a taxable use occurs when the fuel is
taken out of storage facilities and placed into the tank of the airplane, rail-
road engine, or truck."' 41 Consequently, all fuel loaded onto UAL's planes
at O'Hare and Midway Airports measured the tax.42
II. LITIGATION IN THE ILLINOIS COURTS By UAL
UAL promptly contested the new assessment and sought to enjoin the
collection of the tax arguing Commerce and Due Process Clause violations. 48
In addition, plaintiff contended that the Use Tax Act required them to pay
the tax upon only that amount of fuel consumed in Illinois. 44 The Circuit
Court of Cook County upheld the tax and denied the injunction. 45 UAL's
37. The precise amount of tax paid is not known to the writer but according to
the eleaborate charts, diagrams, and computations submitted by UAL, it appears to be
de minimis amounts. Brief for Appellant at 11-16, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,
410 U.S. 623 (1973).
38. 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
39. See, e.g., Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
40. Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929).
41. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 Ill. 2d 45, 48, 273 N.E.2d 585, 586
(1971).
42. Id. at 49, 273 N.E.2d at 587.
43. Discussion of these arguments are omitted here as they are dealt with in de-
tail later in the review.
44. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue No. 63 C. 17049 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County Dec. 9, 1968).
45. Id.
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claim of small amounts of use (consumption) in the state and storage of
the remainder until consumption out of the state was rejected. The court
observed that the imposition of tax was upon the privilege of use, not the
extent.46 Therefore, small amounts of fuel consumed within the state did
not exempt the amounts consumed elsewhere. Since the temporary stor-
age exemption applied to property used solely outside the state after being
temporarily stored here and UAL failed to show that none of the fuel was
consumed in Illinois, the exemption was not available to them. The court
stated that to qualify for the exemption the property itself must be capable
of interstate mercantile transaction after it leaves Illinois47 which UAL's was
not. UAL, not only exercised, in Illinois, the dominion and control over
the fuel to meet the "privilege of use" test invoking Illinois' Use Tax, but,
indeed, UAL itself was the ultimate user and consumer of the fuel it ac-
quired at retail outside the State of Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court in a 4-3 per curiam opinion, affirmed the
lower court decision.48  According to the court the tax upon all the fuel
stored and withdrawn was constitutional. The burn-off theory, pursued by
UAL as an alternative and asserted to be part of the temporary storage
exemption, was deemed not constitutional under Helson, even if it were pos-
sible to construe it from the language of the exemption. 49  The principle
reason relied on by the court in denying the constitutionality of the burn-off
rule was that if Illinois could tax the consumption of fuel to the extent con-
sumed in, and over Illinois, it would follow that every state over which the
planes fly could also tax the consumption of that fuel consumed in flying
between its borders. The result would be an intolerable burden upon inter-
state commerce in the form of multistate taxation5 0 Chief Justice Under-
wood and Justice Goldenhersh concurred (in the per curiam opinion) but
were not convinced that the burn-off rule offended the principles expressed
in Helson.51 They agreed with the result reached by that court because
the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory temporary storage exemp-
tion supported Illinois' revised interpretation of that exemption."2 The fuel
was not temporarily stored here for use solely outside the state.
46. Id. See, e.g., Turner v. Wright, 11 111. 2d 161, 142 N.E.2d 84 (1957).
47. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue No. 63 C 17049 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County Dec. 9, 1968). United advanced throughout the litigation a Hot-Cold Gas
theory whereby planes landing in Chicago with altitude chilled fuel used that fuel first
upon takeoff because the warm gas loaded in Chicago always rose to the top of the
tank. Since Federal regulation required them to always have sufficient fuel to reach
alternate destinations out of the state, all the gas loaded in Chicago was still in tempo-
rary storage. For a detailed discussion see Brief for Appellant, United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
48. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 111. 2d 45, 273 N.E.2d 585 (1971).
49. Id. at 50, 273 N.E.2d at 587.
50. Id. at 51, 273 N.E.2d at 588.
51. Id. at 56, 273 N.E.2d at 591 (concurring per curiam).
52. Id. at 50, 273 N.E.2d at 587 (concurring per curiam).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
The dissent of Justice Kluczynski, joined by Justices Shaefer and Da-
vis, did not find the tax upon all the fuel stored and withdrawn to be un-
constitutional but they agreed that the burn-off rule as applied by the De-
partment of Revenue for eight years, was definitely within the language of
the temporary storage exemption.53 The dissent reasoned that since the
higher tax, measured by all the fuel loaded on UAL's planes did not offend
the Commerce Clause, a fortiori a lower tax, measured by the amount
burned-off would also be constitutional. 54
The per curiam opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court contained the
views of two Justices of the majority seemingly predicated on the anomaly
that the lesser tax under the burn-off rule was an intolerable burden upon
interstate commerce and therefore not permissible while the higher tax on
all the fuel was no burden at all.5 5
111. IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
In a 6-3 decision the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
validity of the Illinois Use Tax as it applied to all the fuel stored, with-
drawn, and loaded by UAL into the tanks of its planes. The decision made
little mention of the elaborate characterizations offered by UAL of the
event taxed.5 6 The Court did eliminate the uncomfortable conclusion of the
Illinois Supreme Court by holding the burn-off rule to be constitutional
when used as a measurement of use tax liability as opposed to the use
taxed. 57
In affirming the use tax liability for all the fuel stored, the Court relied
primarily upon the decisions in Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.,5 s
and Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace,59 as well as the
Illinois court's characterization of the taxable use as being either the storage
or withdrawal therefrom. 0° This procedure eliminated the burden of sort-
ing out the arguments of the parties because storage and withdrawal are
events that may be taxed without violating the Commerce Clause."1 Edel-
man and Nashville definitely authorize state use taxes upon the stor-
age or the withdrawal of fuel despite its commitment to consumption in
interstate commerce. Edelman involved a gasoline use tax levied upon fuel
53. Id. at 57-8, 273 N.E.2d at 591-92 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. at 57, 273 N.E.2d at 591 (dissenting opinion).
55. Id. at 57, 273 N.E.2d at 591 (dissenting opinion).
56. Citations omitted here as this point will be discussed more thoroughly infra.
57. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 632 (1973).
58. 289 U.S. 249 (1933).
59. 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
60. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 627 (1973).
61. This points out the importance of the litigation in the State Supreme Court
as the Court stated, "This Court usually has deferred to the interpretation placed on
a state tax statute by the highest court of the State .... " United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629 (1973).
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brought into the state, stored in tanks and subsequently loaded into planes
embarking on interstate flights. The Nashville case dealt with a Tennessee
privilege tax imposed upon the fuel brought into the state and stored for
the sole purpose of furnishing the motive power for the taxpayers' inter-
state and intrastate railroad operations. In both instances, the taxes did not
offend the Commerce Clause since the taxable events were storage and with-
drawal. As the Court stated in Nashville,
[Tlhere can be no valid objection to the taxation of the exercise
of any right or power incident to . . . ownership of the gasoline,
which falls short of a tax directly imposed on its use in interstate
commerce, deemed forbidden in Helson . . . . Here the tax is
imposed on the successive exercise of two of those powers, the
storage and withdrawal from storage of the gasoline. Both pow-
ers are completely exercised before use of the gasoline in inter-
state commerce begins. The tax imposed upon their exercise is
therefore not one imposed on the use of the gasoline as an in-
strument of commerce and the burden of it is too indirect and
remote from the function of interstate commerce itself to trans-
gress constitutional limitations. 62
The Court quoted the foregoing passage in Edelman and concluded, "such
a tax [in Edelman] cannot be distinguished from that considered and upheld
in . . .Nashville. . .. 63 These cases indicate nothing more than the con-
stitutionality of a state tax upon storage or the withdrawal from storage.
UAL never disputed the principles expressed in Edelman and Nash-
ville, but disputed their application to the Illinois tax because UAL main-
tained that the taxable event of the Illinois Use Tax was the loading, not the
storage or withdrawal. 64 In support of such construction UAL maintained,
It is neither the temporary ground storage of the fuel nor its with-
drawal from such storage because, according to the Illinois Court's
reasoning, what occurs after such withdrawal is decisive as to
whether the tax is imposed. The per curiam opinion is explicit
in stating that, if after withdrawal the fuel were transported from
Chicago to Milwaukee in a tank truck for use at the Milwaukee
airport, no tax would be due. (App.202) It follows that under
the Illinois Court's decision, the taxable event is, and can only be,
the act of loading it aboard United's aircraft in Illinois preparatory
to their interstate journeys. As thus interpreted, the Illinois
Use Tax is imposed on an integral and inseparable component of
the interstate transportation process. 65
Despite UAL's characterization of the event intended to invoke imposition
of the tax,66 the Illinois court's construction of Illinois' statute prevailed.6 7
62. Nashville, Chatanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268
(1933).
63. Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U.S. 249, 252 (1933).
64. Brief for Appellant at 20-30, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623
(1973).
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 20. United urged principles fundamental to Constitutional Law
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However, despite the adoption of this interpretation, the Court did
offer, in a rather lengthy footnote, their explanation of how the taxable
event was complicated by the temporary storage exemption. 8 The Court
stated,
The Illinois court's interpretation of the temporary-storage
provision makes it clear that loading into the tanks of the airplane
is a relevant event but is not the taxable event. The court indi-
cated that the temporary storage exemption suspended the effect
of otherwise taxable events:
To put it another way, the legislature has stated that the
temporary storage and the withdrawal therefrom are not taxable
uses, if the property in question is to be used solely outside the
State. It is clear that if United was to withdraw the fuel from
storage at Des Plaines and the airports and transport it outside
the State for use elsewhere, as for example at an airport in nearby
Wisconsin, the exemption would apply and neither the storage, nor
the withdrawal, nor the transportation of the fuel outside the State
would be uses subject to the tax. 49 Ill. 2d, at 55, 273 N.E.2d,
at 590.
Under this view all the fuel is 'used' and subject to Illinois
tax when it is temporarily stored or withdrawn from storage. The
taxable event is nullified, however, if the fuel is transported from
the State for consumption elsewhere.
Although this use of a subsequent event to determine the ef-
fect of a prior event may appear somewhat unusual, the result
may be said to be compelled since fuel in transit may not be con-
stitutionally taxed. .... .9
The above enlightenment into the operation of the Illinois temporary stor-
age exemption appears reasonable. However, while the use of a subsequent
event to define the effect of a prior event was, as the Court stated, unusual,
the constitutional necessity of this was not clear. If the tax was upon stor-
age, the tax could constitutionally be measured by withdrawal regardless of
its destination. The "in-transit" reference by the Court would not apply to
gasoline stored and mingled with gasoline not destined for out-of-state use. 70
The mere explanation, that the transportation to and use in another state
quoting from Am. Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455 (1965). The validity of state
taxation depends on "the practical operation of the tax, that is, the substance rather
than form ...... and this requires a probing into the "operating incidence." Wiscon-
sin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). And as stated in Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951), "it is not a matter of labels. The
incidence of the tax provides the answer."
67. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629 (1973).
68. Id. at 628, 629, n.5.
69. Id.
70. The storage of gasoline is a taxable use unless brought into the state and de-
layed due to the circumstances. The break in transit by mingling the gas with gas
for local use would deprive the gas of its "in transit" protection, as the gas could not
be said to be committed to interstate commerce. See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 266-68 (1933).
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only served to nullify the taxable event of storage and withdrawal, appeared
more reasonable. However, this could be phrased that if the fuel is not
transported, but is loaded for consumption, there is a tax.71 Consequently,
the Court never adequately explained why storage and withdrawal were the
taxable events.
Discussion of, and agreement with UAL's assertions were found in the
two dissenting opinions (one by Justice Douglas with Justices Stewart and
White and a concurring dissent by Justice White). The dissenters agreed
with the force of the Edelman and Nashville cases:
For Illinois to tax the storage of fuel within its borders is, of
course, constitutionally permissible, even though in time the fuel
may be used in interstate or foreign commerce. In Edelman . . .
'The tax was applied to the stored gasoline as it is withdrawn
from the storage . . .' It is at the time of withdrawal alone that
'use' is measured for the purposes of the tax. .... 72
However, all three Justices considered Illinois' position to be that the stor-
age or the withdrawal were not the events taxed. As Mr. Justice Douglas
stated:
[B]y contrast the taxable event on which Illinois levies her tax is
not storage for future use, or withdrawl from storage, but only
loading in the tanks of planes preparing for interstate or foreign
journeys. It is therefore inescapably a tax on the actual motive
power for an interstate or foreign journey . . .. 73 (Emphasis
added.)
While the majority viewed the loading as relevant in determining whether
or not the temporary storage exemption operated, the dissent saw loading
as the event Illinois itself, had determined was the taxable provocation.
Constitutional approval by the Court of Illinois' Use Tax application to all
the fuel was a mere reaffirmation of Edelman and Nashville.
Significantly however, the Court declared that the burn-off theory is
not per se constitutionally offensive, and that Helson was not authority for
such blanket condemnation. 74 In Helson, the incident and measurement was
consumption, while in United the incident (use) was storage and withdrawal
with consumption as the measurement. The Court stated,
The use of a method of tax measurement that is intimately re-
lated to interstate commerce is not automatically unconstitutional.
Tolls on the use of facilities that aid interstate commerce have
been upheld even when measured by passengers or by mileage
traveled on the highways of a State.75
71. This was precisely UAL's contention.
72. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 638-39 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
73. Id. at 639.
74. Id. at 631.
75. Id. at 632.
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The effects of the Court's declaration here cannot be precisely predicted.
It did, however, remove the suspicion of Commerce Clause violation that
previously attached to taxes measured directly in interstate commerce.
While this could have opened the door for local incident searching by the
states, the result in United was understandable. In likening the situation to
tolls, 76 the Court apparently saw no difficulty in allowing its application to
general state taxes, since Helson was not expressly overruled. Under Helson,
states still are forbidden to tax mere consumption. 77
United was remanded to the Illinois Supreme Court as two of the ma-
jority Justices in a 4-3 per curiam opinion of that court felt compelled to
reject the burn-off theory because as apprehended by them, the United
States Supreme Court had considered, and, in Helson had declared such
tax imposition constitutionally offensive. 78 Consequently, it was not de-
cided whether or not the burn-off rule was within the language of the tem-
porary storage exemption. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court did not
incorporate the burn-off rule into the temporary storage exemption. 79 The
judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County was affirmed and UAL's
use tax liability applied to all the fuel it brought into the state for storage.
The decision in United affects all interstate carriers who store fuel in the
state. The Use Tax continues, along with the ROT, to be the strength of
the state's revenue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principles expressed in Edelman and Nashville were affirmed in
United. In this respect the United decision has maintained a consistency
with past decisions.
An additional principle remains quite lucid after considering the United
case. Interstate commerce must pay its own way. Perhaps that best explains
the rationale of United, because until the decision, UAL paid virtually no
tax on the bulk of its fuel and if Illinois was not able to tax it no one else,
under Helson, could either.
However, by upholding the constitutionality of the burn-off rule, the
Court has added perhaps another case to an area the Court itself has la-
76. Id. The court failed to distinguish tolls from general revenue taxes such as
the Illinois Use Tax. Tolls represent fair compensation to the state for the use of
state facilities and the revenue obtained is usually utilized to maintain these state facil-
ities. In United, the revenue exacted by the Illinois Use Tax does not have to be
used to defray costs that the state expends policing the storage facilities. The tax in
United was upon the privilege of use; it is not related to the state's just compensation
for the use of state facilities. See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist.
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620, 628 (1972).
77. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 631 (1973).
78. Id. at 632.
79. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 54 I1. 2d 431, 298 N.E.2d 16i (1973).
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belled a "quagmire"80 of opinions "not always clear. . . consistent or recon-
cilable."8 1 While the entry of the burn-off theory into the realm of consti-
tutional measurement of general state taxation might well prove to be a
useful and just tool for tax measurement, it has assured the Court of more
"quagmires" and at least, many years of sophisticated games of verbal ping-
pong.
GERALD L. GOLD
80. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-
58 (1959).
81. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
